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Abstract
This paper examines optimal taxation in an economy where wages are
determined by collective bargaining and some or all households save in
capital. With centralized bargaining, wage settlement is strategically
before investment, but with decentralized bargaining vice versa. The
main findings are the following. If bargaining is centralized and the
government can optimally tax wages, employment and consumption,
then capital income should not be taxed in the limit. With decen-
tralized bargaining, capital income taxation is necessary for aggregate
production efficiency. Specific optimal tax rules are derived for both
cases of bargaining.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers how taxes should be optimally determined in a union-
ized economy with capital accumulation. Palokangas (1987 and 2000, Ch. 4)
shows that in a static general equilibrium framework, aggregate production
efficiency can be maintained even in the presence of labour unions as long as
the government can set specific wage and employment taxes. In this study,
we examine whether this result also holds true in a dynamic general equilib-
rium framework, in which private agents save capital and there is a strategic
interdependence between investors and labour unions.
In a dynamic model with investment, aggregate production efficiency
takes lines up with the Judd-Chamley assertion: capital income should be
taxed at a non-zero rate.1 Because capital functions as an intermediate good,
appearing only in the production but not in the utility function, it should
not be taxed, if there are enough instruments to separate consumption and
production decisions. Chamley (2001) shows that this assertion critically de-
pends on the existence of a perfect bond market, in which private agents take
the interest rate as given, households save in bonds, and firms can finance
any amount of investment by issuing bonds. Instead a perfect bond market,
we assume here that households own shares in firms directly. This establishes
a conflict between workers in a firm and households who invest in the firm.
In this study, we assume that there are two groups of households. The
capitalists save and earn all profits and a fixed proportion α of all wages.
The non-capitalists earn the rest (1 − α) of total wages and consume all of
their income. The model is then an extension of two special cases: for α = 0,
Judd’s (1985) case in which the capitalists earn only profits and do not work,
while the workers earn only wages and do not save; and for α = 1, Chamley’s
(1986) model of a representative agent who saves and earns both wages and
profits. We use parameter α as a measure of income distribution.
Optimal taxation in a unionized economy is sensitive to the timing of
investment and wage settlement. For this reason, we examine two cases:
(a) If wages are bargained at the level of a single firm and, in particular, if
wage contracts are not legally binding, then investment is strategically
1Judd (1985), Chamley (1986) and Correia (1996).
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before wage settlement. Because the investment by the firm is a sunk
cost and the firm might not invest big amounts any more for several
years, the union neglects the effect through investment and the firm
knows that some of the profit of its investment will be appropriated by
the union. The investor is a Stackelberg leader and takes in its plans
the parties’ optimal responses in wage settlement into account.
(b) If bargaining over wages concerns a large number of firms simultane-
ously and, in particular, if wage contracts are extended to cover also
non-organized employers and employees, then wage settlement is strate-
gically before investment. Because some of the firms will invest in near
future, the parties in bargaining take also the effect through investment
into account. The investor is a Stackelberg follower and takes the wage
as given. It can expect that wages are not revised immediately after
investment to expropriate the profits of investment.
We call case (a) decentralized and case (b) centralized bargaining, for conve-
nience. By the comparison of these two cases, we can examine the importance
of labour market institutions in the design of optimal policy.
Unfortunately, the Nash bargaining over the wage cannot be introduced
into a dynamic game in which capital stock evolves over time.2 Hence, in
case (b) we must content ourselves with the model of a monopoly union.
Lancing (1999) shows that when the capitalists’ utility is logarithmic and
the government faces a balanced-budget constraint, the steady-state optimal
tax on capital income is generally non-zero. This is because with logarithmic
utility agents’ optimal decisions depend solely on the current rate of return,
not any future rates of return or taxes, and the government is short of useful
policy instruments, because promises about future tax rates do not influence
current allocations. We prove that in a unionized economy Lancing’s result
holds only in the very unlikely special case that all of the following four
2Wage bargaining can be modelled through a game where two parties make alternately
offers to each other to share a pie of exogenous size. In a stationary state, the outcome of
such a game can be expressed by a geometric mean of the parties’ utilities [Cf. Binmore
et al. (1986)]. In case (a) above, capital stock and the size of the pie are exogenous for the
parties of bargaining and the model of wage bargaining can be used. In case (b), the size of
the pie varies with investment and therefore it is endogenous for the parties in bargaining.
For this reason, it is not consistent to use the bargaining model in case (b).
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conditions are simultaneously satisfied: wage contracts are centralized, the
capitalists’ preferences are logarithmic, there are constant returns to scale in
production, and the capitalists earn no labour income.
In this study, we assume also that the government can commit indefinitely
to optimal policy with a balanced budget. This admittedy strong assumption
is made only for tractability. The case of non-commitment has been examined
e.g. in Benhabib and Rustichini (1997) and Phelan and Stacchetti (2001),
and the role of debt policy with optimal taxation in Chari and Kehoe (1999)
and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). In this study, these two extensions would
have excessively complicated the already very complex model.
So far, the literature on optimal taxation with labour unions and the
accumulation of physical capital is very slim. Aronsson et al. (2001) examine
a shift of income taxation from labour to capital. In contrast to this paper,
they however assume a wage-setting monopoly union which maximizes the
utility of the representative household in the economy. Koskela and von
Thadden (2002) show that capital income should be taxed at a non-zero rate.
In contrast to this paper, they however assume a perfect capital market and
that a labour union takes capital stock as given.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies
technology, preferences and taxation. Section 3 and 4 present a dynamic
game with decentralized wage bargaining so that the strategic order of deci-
sions is taxation, investment and wage settlement. Correspondingly, sections
5 and 6 specify a dynamic game with centralized wage bargaining so that the
order is taxation, wage settlement and investment. Both games are solved
by backward induction3 and they result in optimal tax rules.
2 Production, investment and taxation
We aggregate all products in the economy into a single good which is chosen
as the numeraire. There is a fixed number J of similar industries producing
this good. In each industry j, the representative firm (hereafter firm j)
produces its output Yj from its capital Kj and labour Lj through technology
Yj = F (Kj, Lj), FK > 0, FL > 0, FLL < 0, FKK < 0, (1)
3The Stackelberg solution for dynamic games is from Basar and Olsder (1989).
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where subscript K (L) denotes partial derivatives with respect to Kj (Lj).
Unit labour cost for firm j is given by vj=˙(1 + τW )wj + τL, where wj is
the wage in firm j, τW the wage tax and τL the employment tax. Firm j
takes its unit labour cost vj and capital stock Kj as given and maximizes its
profit pij = F (Kj, Lj)− vjLj − µKj by labour input Lj, where the constant
µ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of capital depreciation. This yields the profit function
pij = Π(Kj, vj)
.
= max
Lj
[F (Kj, Lj)− vjLj − µKj] with the properties
ΠK
.
= ∂Π/∂Kj = FK − µ, Πv .= ∂Π/∂vj = −Lj,
ΠKK(Kj, vj) ≡ 0 ⇔ Π(Kj, vj) = max
`
[F (1, `)− vj`− µ]Kj = ΠK(vj)K,
vj = FL(Kj, Lj), wj = [FL(Kj, Lj)− τL]/(1 + τW ). (2)
The elasticity of the demand for labour with respect to unit labour cost vj,
when capital Kj is held constant, is given by
ε(Kj, Lj)
.
=
∣∣∣∣ vjLj ∂Lj∂vj
∣∣∣∣ .= − FL(Kj, Lj)LjFLL(Kj, Lj) . (3)
Each household is subject to the fixed cost b per unit of employment
for the following reasons.4 First, there are commuting costs in proportion
to working days. Second, paid work decreases household’s internal work
which must be replaced by purchasing services from the goods market. We
define labour income in industry j as wages minus the opportunity cost of
employment, W j
.
= wjLj − bLj = (wj − b)Lj. Noting (2), we obtain
W j(Lj, Kj, τW , τL) = (wj − b)Lj =
{
[FL(Kj, Lj)− τL]/(1 + τW )− b
}
Lj,
∂W j
∂Lj
=
FLLLj + FL − τL
1 + τW
− b, ∂W
j
∂Kj
=
FKLLj
1 + τW
. (4)
Total labour income in the economy is defined by
W
.
=
∑
j
W j =
∑
j
(wj − b)Lj. (5)
We assume that each capitalist invests only in a single industry, for
tractability.5 The representative capitalist in industry j (hereafter capitalist
4This is the simplest way of defining unemployment in the model.
5If capitalists invested in all industries, then the levels of investment for all industries
would be ‘bang-bang’ controls and the model would be excessively complicated.
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j) earns a fixed proportion α/J of total labour income in the economy, W ,
and takes this revenue as given. Its budget constraint is therefore given by
K˙j
.
= dKj/dt = αW/J + (1− τK)Π(Kj, vj)− (1 + τC)Cj, (6)
where K˙j is capital accumulation, αW/J exogenous labour income, Π(Kj, vj)
profits, τK tax on capital income, Cj his consumption and τC consumption
tax. Capitalist j’s instantaneous utility is given by
U(Cj)
.
=
{
[C1−σj − 1]/(1− σ) for σ ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1,∞),
log Cj for σ = 1,
(7)
where the constant 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The
non-capitalists consume their entire income net of taxes, (1−α)W/ (1+ τC),
where τC > −1 is the consumption tax. A representative non-capitalist’s
instantaneous utility is then given by the function
V
(
(1− α)W/(1 + τC)
)
, V ′ > 0, V ′′ < 0. (8)
The model integrates two common cases into the same framework. For α = 0,
the capitalists earn only profits and do not work [Cf. Judd (1985)]; and
for α = 1, all agents are similar [Cf. Chamley (1986)]. Hence, using the
parameter α we can examine the effect of income distribution on optimal
taxation in a unionized economy.
We assume that the whole population has the same constant rate of time
preference, ρ > 0 and the social welfare function is a weighted average of the
non-capitalists’ and capitalists’ utilities, (7) and (8):∫ ∞
0
[
V
( 1− α
1 + τC
W
)
+ ϑ
∑
j
U(Cj)
]
e−ρtdt, (9)
where the constant ϑ > 0 is the social weight of the capitalists. The fixed
amount E of public expenditures is financed by taxing total consumption∑
j Cj + (1− α)W/(1 + τC), profits
∑
j pij, wages
∑
j wjLj and employment∑
j Lj. The government’s budget constraint is therefore
E = τC
[∑
j
Cj +
1− α
1 + τC
W
]
+ τK
∑
j
pij + τW
∑
j
wjLj + τL
∑
j
Lj, (10)
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where τK ≤ 1 is the tax on capital income, τW > −1 the wage tax and τL
the employment tax. We assume an upper limit υ ∈ [0,∞) for the capital
subsidy −τK , for tractability, so that6
−υ ≤ τK ≤ 1. (11)
Total capital accumulation
∑
j K˙j is equal to total production
∑
j F (Kj, Lj)
minus the capitalists’ consumption
∑
j Cj, the non-capitalists’ consumption
(1− α)W/(1 + τC), total employment costs b
∑
j Lj, public spending E and
capital depreciation µ
∑
j Kj:∑
j
K˙j =
∑
j
[
F (Kj, Lj)− Cj − 1− α
1 + τC
W j − bLj − E − µKj
]
. (12)
When (12) holds, the goods market is in equilibrium. Then, by Walras’ law,
the government budget is balanced and (10) holds as well.
3 Decentralized bargaining: agents
The workers in firm j are organized in union j. We consider a dynamic game
where the strategic order of the players is (i) the government, which sets
taxes, (ii) capitalist j, which invests, and finally (iii) firm j and union j,
which bargain over the wage wj. This game is solved by backward induction.
In wage bargaining, firm j attempts to maximize its owners’ welfare and
union j attempts to maximize its members’ welfare. Because capital stock
Kj is exogenous for firm j and union j, the outcome of bargaining can be
obtained by maximizing the Generalized Nash product of the parties targets:
Υj(Lj,Kj, τW , τL)
.
= (W j)δpi1−δj
=
{
[FL(Kj, Lj)− τL]/(1 + τW )− b
}δ
Lδj Π
(
Kj, FL(Kj, Lj)
)1−δ
, (13)
where the constant δ ∈ (0, 1] is the union’s relative bargaining power. Be-
cause there is one-to-one correspondence from wj to Lj through (2), the
wage wj can be replaced by employment Lj as the instrument of bargaining.
6Otherwise, the subsidy −τK could get an infinite value in the government’s optimal
optimal policy.
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Noting this, (2), (3), (4) and (13), we obtain that employment and the unit
labour cost are determined by
Lj(Kj, τW , τL)
.
= argmax
Lj
Υj(Lj, Kj, τW , τL) ⇔
[τL + (1 + τW )b]/vj = 1 +
[
(1 + τW )(1/δ − 1)Wj/pij − 1
]
/ε(Kj, Lj),
vj(Kj, τW , τL)
.
= FL(Kj, Lj(Kj, τW , τL)). (14)
We define the elasticity of unit labour cost vj with respect to capital stock
Kj, when taxes (τW , τL) are kept constant, as follows:
²(Kj, τW , τL)
.
=
Kj
vj
∂vj
∂Kj
. (15)
Capitalist j as chooses his consumption Cj to maximize the flow of utility
starting at time zero,
∫∞
0
U(Cj)e
−ρtdt, where t is time and ρ > 0 the rate of
time preference, subject to capital accumulation (6) and the firm’s and the
union’s response (4) and (14), taking unit labour cost in the industry, vj, and
his own labour income αW/J as given. This maximization yields the Euler
equation (see Appendix A)
C˙j
Cj
=
{
(1− τK)
[
FK(Kj, Lj)− µ− Lj
Kj
vj²(Kj, τW , τL)
]
− ρ
}
1
σ
. (16)
Capitalist j can smooth its flow of consumption through investment in capital
Kj. The Euler equation (16) shows how this consumption evolves.
4 Taxation with decentralized bargaining
Because there is perfect symmetry throughout industries j = 1, ..., J , we
obtain Kj = K, Lj = L, Cj = C, W
j = W , ξj = ξ and φj = φ. Noting this
and (2), capital accumulation (12) and the Euler equation (16) become:
K˙ = F (K,L)− C − (1− α)W/(1 + τC)− bL− E/J − µK, (17)
C˙
C
=
{
(1− τK)
[
FK(K,L)− µ− L
K
v²
]
− ρ
}
1
σ
. (18)
The government sets taxes (τC , τL, τW , τK) to maximize social welfare (9)
subject to the development of capital (17) and consumption (18) as well
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as constraints (11) on capital taxation. In Appendix B, we show that this
maximization yields the steady-state conditions,
ϑC−σ = ϑU ′ = V ′
( 1− α
1 + τC
W
)
, v = FL(K
∗, L∗) = b, FK(K∗, L∗) = ρ+ µ,
(19)
and the adjustment of capital taxation,
τK = −υ for K < K∗, τK = 1 for K > K∗, (20)
where L∗ and K∗ are the optimal employment and the optimal capital stock
in the steady-state. The results (19) and (20) can be explained as follows.
With a higher wage tax τW , the labour union substitutes the wage by
employment and the wage decreases. As a consequence, profits and capital
income increase. This mechanism allows the government to efficiently dis-
tribute income so that at the optimum the ratio of the marginal utility of
income for the non-capitalists and capitalists, V ′/U ′, is equal to their relative
social weight ϑ. The employment tax τL decreases the demand for labour,
L. It should be set so that the marginal product of labour, FL, is equal
to the opportunity cost of employment, b. In the steady state, with these
two optimal tax rules, the optimal capital stock K∗ is determined so that
marginal product of capital, FK , is equal to the rate of time preference, ρ,
plus the rate of capital depreciation, µ, and the marginal product of labour,
FL, is equal to the opportunity cost of employment, b. The government must
encourage (discourage) investment as long as capital K is above (below) K∗.
With constant returns to scale, conditions FK(1, L/K) = FK(K,L) =
ρ+ µ and FL(1, L/K) = FL(K,L) = b in (19) hold only if they accidentally
define the same employment-capital ratio L/K. Hence, we conclude:7
Proposition 1 Aggregate production efficiency can be maintained only when
there are decreasing returns to scale in production.
Inserting v = FL = b from (19) into the equilibrium condition (14), we can
explicitly solve for the optimal employment subsidy:
7Because of the steady-state condition ϑC−σ = V ′ and the existence of fixed public
expenditures E, there cannot be endogenous growth with constant returns to scale.
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Proposition 2 Employment should be subsidized at the rate
−τL =
{
τW + [1 + (1− 1/δ)(1 + τW )W/Π]/ε
}
v,
where τW is the wage tax, v unit labour cost, W/Π the ratio of labour income
to profits, ε the elasticity of the demand for labour with respect to unit labour
cost [Cf. (3)], and δ union relative bargaining power.
This subsidy changes the slope of the labour demand function and eliminates
the effect of union power so that in equilibrium FL = b holds. In the special
case of a monopoly union, δ = 1, we obtain the classical rule that with
a monopoly total subsidies relative to the price, (−τL − τWv)/v, must be
equal to the inverse of the elasticity of the demand, 1/ε. If relative union
bargaining power δ is decreased below unity, then a smaller subsidy −τL is
needed to eliminate the effect of union power, ∂(−τL)/∂δ > 0.
In Appendix B, we show furthermore the following result:
Proposition 3 With decentralized wage bargaining, capital income should
be subsidized at the rate −τK =
(
1− vL
ρK
²
)−1 − 1 > 0, where v is unit labour
cost, L/K the labour-capital ratio, ρ the households’ rate of time preference
and ² is the elasticity of unit labour cost with respect to capital (Cf. (15)).
After the capitalist has installed the machines, the union claims higher wages
in bargaining and expropriates part of the profit from the investment. Be-
cause the capitalist observes this, he invests less and capital stock converges
to a lower level. The subsidy −τK eliminates this effect. The more elastic
unit labour cost is with respect to capital stock (i.e. the higher ²), the higher
subsidy −τK is needed to keep capital stock at the socially optimal level.
5 Centralized bargaining: agents
Because Nash bargaining cannot be consistently integrated into a model
where capital stock Kj and consequently income evolves over time, we must
content ourselves with the model of a monopoly union. We consider a dy-
namic game where capitalist j is the follower and union j, which sets the
wage wj, is the leader, taking capitalist j’s investment behaviour as given.
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Capitalist j then chooses his consumption to maximize the flow of his utility
starting at time zero,
∫∞
0
U(Cj)e
−ρtdt, where t is time and ρ > 0 the rate of
time preference, subject to capital accumulation (6) and the functions (4),
taking unit labour cost in the industry, vj, and his own labour income αW/J
as given. This maximization yields the Euler equation (see Appendix C)
C˙j/Cj = [(1− τK)ΠK(Kj, vj)− ρ]/σ. (21)
In the very special case where σ = 1, Π(vj, Kj) = ΠK(vj)Kj and α = 0,
the equations (6) and (21) take the form
K˙j/Kj = (1− τK)ΠK(vj)− (1 + τC)Cj/Kj, C˙j/Cj = (1− τK)ΠK(vj)− ρ.
In this system, the co-state variable Cj jumps to the level [ρ/(1 + τC)]Kj,
which maintains the steady state K˙j/Kj = C˙j/Cj. This reconstructs
Lancing’s (1999) assertion as follows:
Proposition 4 If (i) the capitalists’ preferences are logarithmic, σ = 1,
(ii) there are constant returns to scale in production, Π(vj, Kj) = ΠK(vj)Kj,
(iii) the capitalists earn no labour income, α ≡ 0, and (iv) wage bargaining
is centralized, then the capitalists’ optimal decisions depend solely on the
current rates of return or tax rates, not on future rates of return or tax rates.
In the case of this proposition, the government would be short of useful policy
instruments, because promises about future tax rates do not influence current
allocations. To exclude this very special case, we assume that at least one of
the conditions (i)− (iii) in proposition 4 is not true.
We assume that union j maximizes the value of the flow of labour income
W j, discounted by the households’ rate of time preference, ρ.8 Given (4),
this target is written as∫ ∞
0
W j(Lj, Kj, τW , τL)e
−ρtdt. (22)
Union j sets its wage wj to maximize its welfare (22), given the capitalist’s
Euler equation (21) and capital accumulation (6) and the firm’s responses
8In the steady state, in which the marginal utility of income is constant for households,
this maximization is equivalent to the maximization of the union members’ welfare.
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(4). Because there is a one-to-one correspondence from wj to Lj through
(2), the wage wj can be replaced by employment Lj as the union’s policy
instrument. The union then maximizes by Lj the Hamiltonian
Hj =W
j(Lj, Kj, τW , τL) + ξj
{
(1− τK)[FK(Kj, Lj)− µ]− ρ
}
Cj/σ
+ φj
{
αjW
j(Lj, Kj, τW , τL) + αj
∑
k 6=j
W k + (1− τK)Π(Kj, FL(Kj, Lj))
− (1 + τC)Cj
}
, (23)
where the shadow prices (ξj, φj) for consumption Cj and capital Kj evolve
according to
ξ˙j = ρξj − ∂Hj/∂Cj = ρξj +
{
ρ− (1− τK)[FK(Kj, Lj)− µ]
}ξj
σ
+ (1 + τC)φj,
lim
t→∞
ξjCje
−ρt = 0, (24)
φ˙j = ρφj − ∂Hj/∂Kj = [ρ− (1− τK)(ΠK +ΠvFKL)]φj − (1 + αjφj)WK
− (1− τK)FKKCjξj/σ, lim
t→∞
φjKje
−ρt = 0. (25)
Noting (2) and (4), we obtain the first-order condition for employment Lj as
∂Hj/∂Lj = (1 + αjφj)WL + (1− τK)[FKLξjCj/σ +ΠvFLLφj]
= (1 + αjφj)
{
(1 + τW )
−1[FLL(Kj, Lj)Lj + FL(Kj, Lj)− τL]− b}
+ (1− τK)
[
FKL(Kj, Lj)ξjCj/σ − LjFLL(Kj, Lj)φj
]
= 0. (26)
This defines employment Lj (and hence also the wage wj) as a function of
capital stock Kj, the shadow prices for consumption and capital, (ξj, φj),
and taxes (τL, τW , τK). The condition (26) together with the development of
the shadow prices (ξj, φj) for consumption Cj and capital Kj determine the
union’s behaviour uniquely for given taxes (τC , τK , τL, τW ).
6 Taxation with centralized bargaining
Because there is perfect symmetry throughout industries j = 1, ..., J , we
obtain Kj = K, Lj = L, Cj = C, W
j = W , ξj = ξ and φj = φ. Noting this
and (2), capital accumulation (12), the Euler equation (21) and the union’s
equilibrium conditions (24)-(26) take the form
K˙ = F (K,L)− C − (1− α)W/(1 + τC)− bL− E/J − µK, (27)
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C˙/C = [(1− τK)[FK(K,L)− µ]/σ − ρ/σ, (28)
ξ˙ =
{
ρ+ ρ/σ − (1− τK)[FK(K,L)− µ]/σ
}
ξ + (1 + τC)φ, lim
t→∞
ξCe−ρt = 0,
(29)
φ˙ =
{
ρ− (1− τK)[FK(K,L)− FKL(K,L)L− µ]
}
φ− (1− τK)FKKCξ/σ
− (1 + τW )−1(1 + αφ)FKLL, lim
t→∞
φKe−ρt = 0, (30)
(1 + αφ)
{
(1 + τW )
−1[FLL(K,L)L+ FL(K,L)− τL]− b}
+ (1− τK)
[
FKL(K,L)ξC/σ − LFLL(K,L)φ
]
= 0. (31)
We extend the dynamic game in the preceding section so that the govern-
ment is the Stackelberg leader over both the investor and the parties in wage
bargaining. It then sets taxes τC , τK , τL and τW to maximize social welfare
(9) subject to the dynamics of the economy (27)-(31) and the constraints for
the capital tax (11). In Appendix D, we show that results (19) and (20) as
well as proposition 1 holds also in the case of centralized bargaining.
Equations C˙ = 0, (28) and (19) imply 0 = (1− τK)ΠK − ρ = −τKρ. This
yields τK = 0 and the following result:
Proposition 5 The steady-state capital-income tax τK = 0 should be zero.
The explanation of this result is the following. The government balances
its budget by the consumption tax τC . Because taxes on wages, labour and
consumption are sufficient to redistribute income, to achieve the optimal
production efficiency and to balance the government’s budget, the tax rate
on capital income, τK , should be zero. Any deviation from this zero tax rate
would distort aggregate production efficiency.
Noting (2) and (27)-(19), we show the following tax rule (Appendix E):
Proposition 6 The optimal employment subsidy is given by
−τL = τWv + F
2
KL − FKKFLL
σρFKL/(cK) + FKK/L
, (32)
where v is the unit labour cost, τW the wage tax and c
.
= (1 + τC)C/K the
capitalists’ consumption expenditure per unit of capital.
The application of this rule presupposes information on the shape of the pro-
duction function F (K,L). We specify the rule for Cobb-Douglas technology
F (K,L)
.
= AKϕL1−1/ε, ϕ > 0, ϕ+ 1− 1/ε < 1, A > 0, (33)
12
where A is a constant, the parameter ε the elasticity of employment with
respect to unit labour cost [Cf. (3)] and the parameter ϕ the elasticity of
output F with respect to capital K, when employment L is kept constant.
Given (33), we obtain FLL = −F/(εL), FKK = (ϕ − 1)FK/K and FKL =
ϕFL/K = (1 − 1/ε)FK/L. Inserting these and FL = v from (19) into (32)
yields a corollary for proposition 6:
Proposition 7 With (33), the optimal employment tax is given by
−τL = τWv + (ϕ− 1/ε)v
(1− 1/ε)σρ/c+ ϕ− 1 .
7 Conclusions
This paper examines optimal taxation in a unionized economy. Workers in
each industry form a union, which raises their wage above the opportunity
cost of employment. Decentralized wage bargaining covers only a single firm,
but centralized wage bargaining a large number of firms. Some (or all) house-
holds specified as capitalists save and earn a fixed proportion of all wages,
while the others specified as non-capitalists spend all of their income. The
government can tax consumption, employment, wages and capital income.
The main findings of this paper are the following.
The wage subsidy redistributes income between capitalists and others.
Its increase makes labour unions to substitute employment by the wage
and wages increase. As a consequence, profits and capital income decrease.
Through this mechanism, the government can efficiently distribute income so
that at the optimum the ratio of the marginal utility of income for the non-
capitalists and capitalists is equal to their relative social weight. The gov-
ernment must subsidize employment to keep the marginal product of labour
equal to the opportunity cost of employment. Because aggregate production
efficiency requires that the marginal product of labour equals the opportu-
nity cost of employment, wage and employment subsidies together must be
positive to maintain incentives to supply labour. The consumption tax is
needed to balance the government’s budget.
Optimal public policy is possible only if there are decreasing returns to
scale. In the steady state, the marginal product of capital is equal to the
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rate of time preference plus the rate of capital depreciation. Because with
constant returns to scale this steady-state condition fixes the capital-labour
ratio, the marginal product of labour and the opportunity cost of employment
can be equalized only in the case of decreasing returns to scale.
Zero taxation of capital income in the limit does not apply to the union-
ized economy with decentralized bargaining, but applies if there is centralized
bargaining. With decentralized bargaining, capital accumulation increases
employment for given wages. This strengthens the union’s position in bar-
gaining and raises wages. Because the capitalist takes the effect of capital
accumulation on wages into account in his investment plans, production effi-
ciency cannot be maintained without a subsidy to capital income. With cen-
tralized wage bargaining, aggregate production efficiency can be maintained
by the consumption tax and subsidies to wages and employment. Because
these three instruments are sufficient to redistribute income, to achieve pro-
duction efficiency and to balance the government’s budget, the tax rate on
capital income should be zero. Any deviation from this zero tax rate would
distort aggregate production efficiency.
These tax rules hold for any proportion of wages earned by the capital-
saving households. This includes also the Judd case in which only capitalists
save, as well as the Chamley case in which all households are similar.
Appendix
A. The Euler equation in the case of decentralized bargaining
Noting (2), (7) and (14), we obtain the Hamiltonian for the capitalist’s
maximization in the case of decentralized bargaining as follows:
HCj = U(Cj) + λj
[
αW/J + (1− τK)Π
(
Kj, vj(Kj, τW , τL)
)− (1 + τC)Cj],
where the co-state variable λ evolves according to
λ˙j = ρλj − ∂H
Cj
∂Kj
=
[
ρ− (1− τK)
(
FK − µ− Lj ∂vj
∂Kj
)]
λj,
lim
t→∞
λjKje
−ρt = 0. (34)
The first-order condition for capitalist j’s optimization is given by
C−σj = U
′(Cj) = (1 + τC)λj. (35)
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Noting (14), (15), (34) and (35), we obtain
C˙j
Cj
= − 1
σ
λ˙j
λj
=
{
(1− τK)
[
FK(Kj, Lj)− µ− Lj ∂vj
∂Kj
]
− ρ
}
1
σ
=
{
(1− τK)
[
FK(Kj, Lj)− µ− (Lj/Kj)vj²(Kj, τW , τL)
]− ρ}/σ. (36)
Variables Kj and Cj are governed by the system (6) and (36), the dynamics
of which is as follows. Because ∂K˙j/∂Cj < 0,
∂K˙j
∂Kj
∣∣∣∣
C˙j=0
= (1− τK)
(
FK − µ− Lj
Kj
vj²
)
C˙j=0
= ρ > 0,
∂C˙j
∂Cj
∣∣∣∣
C˙j=0
= 0,
we obtain[
∂K˙j
∂Kj
+
∂C˙j
∂Cj
]
C˙j=0
> 0, 0 =
[
∂K˙j
∂Kj
∂C˙j
∂Cj
]
C˙j=0
<
∂K˙j
∂Cj
∂C˙j
∂Kj
⇔ ∂C˙j
∂Kj
< 0.
This means that there exists a saddle-point solution for ∂C˙j/∂Kj < 0, but
otherwise the system is globally stable. Hence, the capitalist’s equilibrium is
indeterminate for ∂C˙j/∂Kj ≥ 0. Only if ∂C˙j/∂Kj < 0, the capitalist has a
unique solution where the co-state variable Cj (which represents λj) jumps
onto the saddle path which leads to the steady state in which Kj, Cj and λj
are constants, and limt→∞ λjKje−ρt = 0 holds. We assume the latter.
B. Optimal policy in the case of decentralized bargaining
Because there is a one-to-one correspondence from (τL, τW ) to W and L
through (4) and (14), employment and wage taxes (τL, τW ) can be replaced by
labour income W and employment L as control variables. The Hamiltonian
and Lagrangean corresponding to the government’s maximization are
HG = V ((1− α)W/(1 + τC))+ ϑU(C)
+ η
{
(1− τK)[FK(K,L)− µ− (L/K)v²]− ρ
}
C/σ
+ κ
[
F (K,L)− C − (1− α)W/(1 + τC)− bL− E − µK
]
,
LG = HG + ν1[τK + υ] + ν2[1− τK ], (37)
where the functions L and ∂vj/∂Kj are given by (14) and the co-state vari-
ables evolve κ and η according to
κ˙ = ρκ− ∂L
G
∂K
, lim
t→∞
Kκe−ρt = 0, η˙ = ρη − ∂L
G
∂C
, lim
t→∞
Cηe−ρt = 0. (38)
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Noting (37), the first-order condition for τK is given by
∂LG/∂τK = ∂HG/∂τK + ν1 − ν2
= [µ+ (L/K)v²− FK ](C/σ)η + ν1 − ν2 = 0. (39)
Assume first −υ < τK < 1, so that ν1 = ν2 = 0. Because C > 0 by (35), from
(39) it follows that η = 0. Noting η = 0 and (37), the first-order conditions
for L and W are
V ′ = κ, v = FL(K,L) = b. (40)
Because ∂2HG/∂τ 2K ≡ 0, we have to solve τK through the generalized
Legendre-Clebsch conditions:9
∂
∂τK
( dp
dtp
∂HG
∂τK
)
= 0 for any odd integrer p,
(−1)q ∂
∂τK
( d2q
dt2q
∂HG
∂τK
)
≥ 0 for any integrer q, (41)
where t is time.
Differentiating the first of equations (39) with respect to time t and noting
(7), (16), (37), (38), η = 0 and ν1 = ν2 = 0, we obtain
d
dt
(∂HG
∂τK
)
=
(
µ+
L
K
v²− FK
)C
σ
η˙
∣∣
η=0
= −
(
µ+
L
K
v²− FK
)C
σ
∂HG
∂C
= −
(
µ+
L
K
v²− FK
)C
σ
(ϑC−σ − κ) = 0, ∂
∂τK
d
dt
(∂HG
∂τK
)
= 0. (42)
Given these, we furthermore obtain
d2
dt2
(∂HG
∂τK
)
=
(
µ+
L
K
v²− FK
)
ϑC−σC˙ = 0,
∂
∂τK
d2
dt2
(∂HG
∂τK
)
=
(
µ+
L
K
v²− FK
)2
ϑC−σ
C
σ
> 0. (43)
Results (42) and (43) satisfy the Clebsch-Legendre conditions (41). From
(18) and (43) it follows that
0 = σC˙/C = (1− τK)[FK − µ− (L/K)v²]− ρ. (44)
9Cf. Bell and Jacobson (1975), p. 12-19.
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From (40) and (42) it follows that
ϑC−σ = κ = V ′. (45)
Differentiating ϑC−σ = κ with respect to time t and noting η = 0, (2), (37),
(38) and C˙ = 0 by (43) yield κ˙ = (ρ+ µ− FK)κ and
ρ = FK(K,L)− µ. (46)
Results (40) and (46) yield (19).
From (40) and (46) it follows that the value (K∗, L∗) for (K,L) in the
steady state is determined by two equations FK(K
∗, L∗) = ρ + µ and
FL(K
∗, L∗) = b. Noting (51) and (52), we obtain the following. If η > 0
(η < 0), then the capital subsidy (tax) should be raised to the maximum,
−τW = η (τW = 1), so that the capitalist accumulates (exhausts) capital,
K˙ > 0 (K˙ > 0). Since the system ends up with a steady state in which K,
C, χ and κ are constants, limt→∞Kηe−ρt = 0 and limt→∞Cκe−ρt = 0 hold.
Finally, given (15), (44) and (46), we obtain
ρ = (1− τK)
(
ρ− L
K
v²
)
= (1− τK)
(
ρ− L
K
v²
)
, −τK =
(
1− vL
ρK
²
)−1
− 1.
C. The Euler equation in the case of centralized bargaining
The Hamiltonian corresponding to the capitalist’s maximization in the
case of centralized bargaining is given by
HCj =U(Cj) + θj
[
αW/J + (1− τK)Π(Kj, vj)− (1 + τC)Cj
]
,
where the co-state variable θj evolves according to
θ˙j = ρθj − ∂H
Cj
∂Kj
= [ρ− (1− τK)ΠK(Kj, vj)]θj, lim
t→∞
θjKje
−ρt = 0. (47)
The first-order condition for the capitalist’s maximization is given by C−σj =
U ′(Cj) = (1 + τC)θj. Noting this, we can transform the constraint (47) into
the capitalist’s Euler equation
C˙j/Cj = −(1/σ)θ˙j/θj = [(1− τK)ΠK(Kj, vj)− ρ]/σ. (48)
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VariablesKj and Cj are governed by (6) and (48). When there are decreasing
returns to scale in production, ΠKK < 0, the dynamics is as follows. Because
∂K˙j/∂Kj = (1 − τK)ΠK > 0, ∂K˙j/∂Cj < 0, ∂C˙j/∂Kj = (1 − τK)ΠKKCj/σ
< 0 and [∂C˙j/∂Cj]C˙j=0 = 0, we obtain
∂K˙j
∂Kj
+
∂C˙j
∂Cj
∣∣∣∣
C˙j=0
> 0,
∂K˙j
∂Kj
∂C˙j
∂Cj
∣∣∣∣
C˙j=0
<
∂K˙j
∂Cj
∂C˙j
∂Kj
,
and there is a saddle-point solution. Hence, the co-state variable Cj (which
represents θj) jumps onto the saddle path which leads to the steady state in
which Kj, Cj and θj are constants, and limt→∞ θjKje−ρt = 0 holds.
With constant returns to scale ΠKK ≡ 0, from (2), (6) and (47) it follows
that[
K˙j
Kj
+
θ˙j
θj
− ρ
]
K˙j=0
=
[
αj
∑
k
W k − (1 + τC)Cj
Kj
]
K˙j=0
= (τK − 1)ΠK < 0.
This as well implies the transversality condition limt→∞Kjθje−ρtdt = 0.
D. Optimal policy in the case of centralized bargaining
Because there is a one-to-one correspondence from (τL, τW ) to W and L
through (4) and (26), employment and wage taxes (τL, τW ) can be replaced
by labour income W and employment L as control variables. Noting (7), the
Hamiltonian and the Lagrangean corresponding to the government’s maxi-
mization in the case of centralized bargaining are given by
H = V
( 1− α
1 + τC
JW
)
+ ϑJU(C) + γ
{
(1− τK)[FK(K,L)− µ]− ρ
}
C/σ
+ χ
{
F (K,L)− C − (1− α)W/(1 + τC)− bL− µK − E/J
}
, ,
LG = H + ϕ1[τK + υ] + ϕ2[1− τK ], (49)
where the co-state variables χ and γ evolve according to
γ˙ = ργ − ∂H/∂C = [ρ+ ρ/σ − (1− τK)(FK − µ)/σ]γ + χ− ϑJC−σ,
χ˙ = ρχ− ∂H/∂K = [ρ+ µ− FK(K,L)]χ− (1− τK)FKKCγ/σ,
lim
t→∞
χKe−ρt = 0, lim
t→∞
γCe−ρt = 0, (50)
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and variables ϕ1 and ϕ2 satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
ϕ1[τK + ηυ] = 0, ϕ1 ≥ 0, ϕ2[1− τK ] = 0, ϕ2 ≥ 0. (51)
Noting (49), the first-order condition for τK is given by
∂H/∂τK = (µ− FK)Cγ/σ + ϕ1 − ϕ2 = 0. (52)
Assume first −υ < τK < 1, so that ϕ1 = ϕ2 = 0. Because ∂2H/∂(τK)2 ≡ 0,
we have to solve for τK through the generalized Clebsch-Legendre conditions
(41). Because C > 0 and (FK − µ)C˙=0 > 0 by (28), equation (52) yields
γ = 0. Differentiating (52) with respect to time t and noting (2), (21), (28),
(50) and γ = 0, we see that the Clebsch-Legendre conditions (41) hold:
d
dt
(
∂H
∂τK
)
= (µ− FK)C
σ
γ˙
∣∣
γ=0
= ΠK
C
σ
[ϑJC−σ − χ] = 0, (53)
∂
∂τK
d
dt
(
∂H
∂τK
)
= 0,
d2
dt2
(
∂H
∂τK
)
= −ΠKC
σ
[χ˙+ σϑJC−σ−1C˙] = 0, (54)
∂
∂τK
d2
dt2
(
∂H
∂τK
)
= −ΠKC
σ
[
∂χ˙
∂τK
+
σϑJ
Cσ+1
∂C˙
∂τK
]
= (ΠK)
2 ϑ
σ2
JC1−σ > 0. (55)
Given (53), we obtain
χ = ϑJC−σ. (56)
From γ = 0, (2), (28), (50), (54) and (56) it follows that
0 = χ˙+ σϑJC−σ−1C˙ = (ρ+ µ− FK)χ+ ϑJC−σ[(1− τK)ΠK − ρ]
= (ρ− ΠK)ϑJC−σ + ϑJC−σ[(1− τK)ΠK − ρ] = −ϑJC−στKΠK ,
which is equivalent to τK = 0.
Noting γ = 0 and (49), the first-order conditions for W and L are
∂H/∂W = (1− α)(JV ′ − χ) = 0, ∂H/∂L = χ(FL − b) = 0. (57)
Given (56) and (57), we obtain ϑC−σ = χ/J = V ′ and
FL = b, ϑC
−σ = V ′, (58)
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and the adjustment rules (20). The system (12) and (21) produces a steady
state in which K and C are kept constant. Given C˙ = 0, (2), (21) and τK = 0
in (58), we obtain
ρ = FK(K,L)− µ = ΠK . (59)
Equations (58) and (59) yield (19).
From (59) and (58) it follows that the value (K∗, L∗) for (K,L) in the
steady state with γ = 0 is determined by two equations FK(K
∗, L∗) = ρ+ µ
and FL(K
∗, L∗) = b. Noting (51) and (52), we obtain the following. If γ > 0
(γ < 0), then the capital subsidy (tax) should be raised to the maximum,
−τW = υ (τW = 1), so that the capitalist accumulates (exhausts) capital,
K˙ > 0 (K˙ > 0). Since the system ends up with a steady state in which K,
C, χ and γ are constants, limt→∞Kχe−ρt = 0 and limt→∞Cγe−ρt = 0 hold.
E. The optimal employment tax in the case of centralized bargaining
In the steady state, consumption C, capital stock K and shadow prices
ξ and φ are constant. Noting (19) and τK = 0, conditions (28)-(31) then
become C˙ = 0 and
ξ˙ = ρξ + (1 + τC)φ = 0, lim
t→∞
φKe−ρt = 0, (60)
φ˙ = LFKL[φ− (1 + τW )−1(1 + αφ)]− FKKCξ/σ = 0, lim
t→∞
φKe−ρt = 0,
(61)
0 = (1 + αφ)
[
(1 + τW )
−1(LFLL + b− τL)− b
]
+ FKLξC/σ − LFLLφ. (62)
Equation (60) yields ξ = −(1 + τC)φ/ρ. Inserting this into (61), we obtain
1 + αφ = (1 + τW )
[
φ− ξFKKC
σLFKL
]
= (1 + τW )φ
[
1 + (1 + τC)
FKKC
σρLFKL
]
.
Inserting this, ξ = −(1+ τC)φ/ρ and v = FL = b [Cf. (2) and (19)] into (62),
and defining c
.
= (1 + τC)C/K, we furthermore obtain
0 =
1 + αφ
φ
[
LFLL + b− τL
1 + τW
− b
]
+
ξC
σφ
FKL − LFLL
=
[
1 + (1 + τC)
FKKC
σρLFKL
][
LFLL − τL − τW b
]− (1 + τC) C
σρ
FKL − LFLL
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= (1 + τC)
FKKFLL
σρFKL
C − (1 + τC)CFKL
σρ
−
[
1 + (1 + τC)
FKKC
σLFKL
]
(τL + τW b)
=
(1 + τC)C
σρFKL
(
FKKFLL − F 2KL
)− [1 + (1 + τC) FKKC
σρLFKL
]
(τL + τWv)
=
(1 + τC)C
σρFKL
{
FKKFLL − F 2KL −
[
σρFKL
(1 + τC)C
+
FKK
L
]
(τL + τWv)
}
=
(1 + τC)C
σρFKL
{
FKKFLL − F 2KL −
[
σρFKL
cK
+
FKK
L
]
(τL + τWv)
}
and (32).
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